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likely to do, "the Treasury Secretary told me yesterday," etc.), which is only useful for a very limited time frame in very specific markets. |
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Neal: Well, we all are not a bunch of saints here either, are we? |
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Grant: Of course, we also have plenty of con artists in Chicago peddling the latest investment fads. But maybe it is due to the fact that there isn't an insider pipeline to whether this summer is going to be dry or wet. I don't see a big scramble for insider information in Chicago. Chicago concentrates on what works versus what sells. And what works is sophisticated technical analysis, not the tripe usually peddled as "technical analysis." The massive commodity bull of 19731974 created an awe of technical analysis among futures traders. While "fundamentalists" stood and watched ''impossible moves," technicians like Gene Cashman and Richard Dennis became megamillionaires. Before that, technicians were crazies who met in back rooms and discussed their charts in low voices lest anyone hear them. Now they became gods who could do no wrong. The track record of most "technicians" in futures has been lousy since then, but this did give some of the smarter traders a head start in studying what actually works. The brighter minds of the futures industry are now rapidly moving away from another computerized permutation of the "sacred six" (open, high, low, close, volume, and open interest). |
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Neal: So how do you see the stock and bond side of the business? |
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Grant: In my opinion, the stock and bond industries have reached the same position that futures were in 20 years ago. An unprecedented bull market has shattered every "fundamental" rule in the stock market. Traditional indicators have been left in |
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